When a Debtor Files a Response Pro Se

January 11, 2011

As a creditor’s rights attorney, I often receive Answers to our Complaints filed Pro Se by  Defendants. Sometimes these Answers are in the proper format and I assume that an attorney prepared the response but declined to enter his appearance. Sometimes, however, they simply consist of a paragraph denying liability for the debt or expressing an interest in entering into a payment plan. Whether or not they are in the proper format is irrelevant, however, if the Defendant is a corporation. Thanks to the Pennsylvania case of Walacavage v. Excell 2000, Inc., 331 Pa.Super. 137, 480 A.2d 281 (Pa.Super., 1984) a corporate entity may only appear in court through an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. This means that if an individual who owns a corporation files a Pro Se response to a Complaint that names only the corporation as the defendant he is in violation of Pennsylvania law.

The Court in Walacavage also addressed the concern that the requirement of a corporate entity to hire counsel puts corporations at a disadvantage. The Court stated that such a requirement does not deny corporations due process or equal protection under the law. It seems that there are several rationales behind this requirement one of which is the fact that a corporation is technically fictitious so that even if the individual filing the Pro Se response is the President of the corporation, the corporation itself is a fabrication and, therefore, cannot represent itself. Another suggested rationale is that incorporating a business brings many benefits including protection from personal liability. By the same token, however, there are responsibilities that come with such protection including the responsibility to hire an attorney for representation. Finally, it is suggested that the legal issues before the court can become confused when an attorney is not representing a corporation, however, I don’t see how it can be any more confusing for the court than when an individual represents himself…it can be bewildering for everyone involved.  I, personally, believe that the rationale accounting for equal benefits and responsibilities makes the most sense. If an individual wants to remain shielded from personal liability he is going to have sacrifice some benefits that he would otherwise have if not incorporated such as the ability to represent himself in court. You can’t have your cake and represent it in court, too.

                It is always surprising to me how many individuals who have incorporated a business are unaware of the necessity of retaining counsel for a legal matter. In my opinion, the best way to go about dealing with a Pro Se response from a corporate defendant is to file Preliminary Objections to the response. Filing Preliminary Objections to a Pro Se response from a corporate Defendant can save a great deal of time for you and a great deal of money for your client. I find that it often leads to settlement or, better yet, has the effect of getting the response stricken followed by Judgment by Default. From both a financial and expeditious perspective either of these two scenarios is preferable to having to prepare for and attend arbitration or trial as well as requiring your client to send a witness to court.

Fraudulent Transfers: Not All Payments Are Created Equal

January 3, 2011

Many of you are familiar with preferences actions and the defenses to those actions. You may not be aware of fraudulent transfer actions. With the increasing rise in bankruptcy cases in which the main secured creditor is “under water,” bankrupt debtors and trustees are using preference actions as a primary means for collecting funds to distribute to unsecured creditors. However, since unsecured creditors are increasingly aware of preference defenses and how to properly deal with questionable debtors, preference actions are becoming less profitable for the bankruptcy estate. As a result, we’re seeing an increase in the use of fraudulent transfer actions to recover funds for the estate.

 

There are two types of fraudulent transfer actions: actual fraud (the Debtor deliberately defrauds creditors) an constructive fraud (discussed below). Since actual fraud is somewhat rare, this article is focused on constructively fraudulent transfers.

 

A transfer is constructively fraudulent if: (1) the debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer and (2) the debtor was (a) insolvent on the date of the transfer or became insolvent as a result of the transfer, (b) the debtor was engaged or was about to engage in a business or transaction for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital, or (c) the debtor intended to incur or believed that it would incur debts beyond the debtor’s ability to pay as such debts matured.

 

Most of the cases relating to fraudulent transfers focus on the “reasonably equivalent value” language of the statute. Generally speaking, the courts look to (1) whether the value transferred by the Debtor is approximately equal to the value of what was received by the Debtor in exchange for the transfer and (2) whether the transaction took place at an arm’s length.

 

In a typical scenario, a vendor provides goods or services having a certain value and the Debtor makes payment sometime thereafter. In this situation, no fraudulent transfer has occurred because the Debtor received “reasonably equivalent value” for its payment.

 

However, imagine the following scenario: A construction company is composed of three affiliates. Company A cuts timber and delivers it to Company B. Company B processes the timber and makes plywood and delivers it to Company C. Company C uses the plywood to make kitchen cabinets. While these three companies share some common owners, they conduct business at arms-length, do not have any parent-subsidiary relationships and are, for all intents and purposes, separate and distinct legal entities.

 

Now imagine the creditor that provides $100,000 worth of monthly shipping services for Company A. This creditor is “bankruptcy savvy” and, therefore, insists on 30 day payment terms and strict adherence to payments made in the “ordinary course of business.” All three companies file for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. When the creditor receives notice of Company A’s bankruptcy, the creditor is secure in knowing that any potential preference action would top out at $300,000 (three months worth of payments) and knows that it has strong defenses to such an action.

 

Months later, the creditor receives a complaint from the Trustee in Company C’s Bankruptcy demanding the return of $2.4 million worth of “fraudulent transfers.” The complaint indicates that for many years all three companies were insolvent and had problems balancing cash flow. Due to these problems, Company C would pay some of Company A’s Accounts Payable. Pursuant to this arrangement, Company C paid all of the creditors invoices that were directed to Company A. The trustee claims that when Company C paid the monthly invoices for Company A, Company C received no value whatsoever, since the services were delivered to Company A. The trustee therefore demands the return of 2 years worth of monthly payments paid by Company C. Upon review of its file, the creditor is shocked to notice that the checks it received on its invoices were from Company C and not Company A.

 

Sounds ridiculous, right? Well, while there are certain fact intensive exceptions, such transactions are generally considered “fraudulent transfers” that are recoverable by a bankruptcy trustee.

 

A creditor that unknowingly receives such a fraudulent transfer is in a very unfortunate situation. While preferences only occur during the 90 days preceding the preference action, the bankruptcy code’s “look back” period for fraudulent transfers is 2 years (which can actually increase depending on which state’s laws apply). Consequently, creditors are at risk of much larger lawsuits being filed to recover fraudulent transfers than the typical preference actions, making it very hard to limit a creditors’ exposure.

 

More importantly, preference defenses – i.e. ordinary course of business, new value, contemporaneous exchange – do not apply to fraudulent transfers. The fraudulent transfer defenses – typically that the payor received reasonably equivalent value and/or that the payor was insolvent at the time it made the payment – are heavily fact intensive. In other words, the litigation is time consuming and expensive.

 

For legal and tax purposes, most large companies are split into multiple affiliates, meaning the risks posted by fraudulent transfer actions to unknowing creditors are quite large. For those “bankruptcy savvy” creditors that I mentioned, the best way to protect against such an action is to demand payment from the debtor to which you supplied services. While accepting payment from an affiliate is often the easiest way to get paid timely, it may ultimately end up costing you substantially down the road.

 

 

Rules of Evidence?: Yes, They Apply in Creditor-Debtor Disputes

December 16, 2010

Once a claim goes legal, there are many factors that come into play and directly impact a creditor’s ability to get paid.  As a credit professional, you must be aware of these factors to determine their impact on settlement negotiations and how far you decide to push the debtor.  As a creditors’ rights attorney, we must be available to quickly identify how these factors impact litigation and provide our clients with intelligent insight as to how litigation is likely to play out in light of these factors.

 

The rules of evidence are such a factor.  All of a sudden the forwarded email from a cousin’s mother’s friend who used to work for the debtor may not make it to the trier-of-fact, let alone have the impact the creditor thought it would.   

 

In the typical creditor-debtor dispute, evidence usually translates to written documents (contracts, invoices, statements, correspondence etc.) setting forth the basis for the parties’ relationship.  As a result of being a simple man, I like to keep in mind three simple concepts when determining whether I can get documents into evidence.  Those concepts are:

 

1.       Relevance – Why does this matter?

2.       Authentication – Is this real?

3.       Hearsay – Is this reliable?

 

The first concept is pretty self explanatory and is often easily understood because it involves logic that makes sense to a layperson.  For example, my client’s contract with the debtor is relevant to the issue of whether or not money is owed to my client.  Whereas, my client’s lease with their landlord has no bearing on the issue. 

 

It is with issues of authentication and hearsay, that clients and attorneys spend an inordinate amount of time explaining to each other and arguing with debtor’s counsel.  I could write pages upon pages trying to explain these concepts, so I will leave you with three helpful tips.  The last being the most useful.  Pay attention to rules on self-authenticating documents to hopefully ease the burden on yourself.  Hearsay is an out of court statement offered for its truth, it remains hearsay even if the declarant is now on the stand during trial.  Lastly, evidence law is determined by the trial judge that you are currently practicing before.  

 

I would like to wrap up by sharing a recent experience that illustrates why it is important to keep evidence concepts in mind throughout the legal process. 

 

I recently had a case where debtor’s counsel filed preliminary objections in response to my client’s complaint.  Simultaneously, debtor’s counsel served discovery requests.  More specifically, debtor’s counsel served a request for production of documents seeking the original credit application that was alleged in the complaint.  Debtor’s counsel filed preliminary objections asking the court to dismiss the complaint because we failed to attach the original credit application to our complaint.  The basis for these objections being that the failure to attach the original credit application was a violation of the Best Evidence Doctrine.  Well, we didn’t have the original credit application.  We told debtor’s counsel we didn’t have it in our responses to discovery.  However, in deciding the preliminary objections, the judge correctly overruled the debtor.  As simple as it sounds, debtor’s counsel forgot one importance aspect of the Best Evidence Doctrine.  It doesn’t come into play until a party is trying to put evidence into the record at trial.   

 

As for how that case turned out at trial … it will probably settle soon.     

Keep a Close Eye On Multiple Bankruptcy Filers

October 8, 2010

It is now common to see individuals file 2, 3, even 4 personal bankruptcies. As the economy continues to stagnate, we are beginning to see multiple filers more often. Creditors should be on alert.

 

One of the primary reasons for the US bankruptcy system is to give debtors a “fresh start.” The theory is that a debtor weighed down by mountains of debt will have no rational motivation to work hard and contribute to society because any accumulated wealth will just be taken by his/her creditors. A bankruptcy discharge allows such a debtor the ability to avoid those debts and get on with his/her life. If such a discharge were not available, thousands of American citizens would have no reason to contribute to society and, therefore, become a burden to the rest of the country.

 

However, an individual debtor may file bankruptcy and receive a discharge of all of his/her debts once every seven years. In addition to being able to “burn” their creditors more than once, multiple filers pose even greater threats. Most first-time filers are unaware of how bankruptcy works (i.e. what can and cannot be discharged, how long the process takes, etc.). On the other hand, multiple filers know what debts can be readily discharged and are better able to “game” the system.

 

As a result, second (or third, or fourth . . .) time filers often prepare for bankruptcy years in advance by rebuilding their credit, obtaining credit and increasing their debts gradually, with no real intention to repay those debts. This is fraud, plain and simple. As a result, creditors should be on alert for second-time filers.

 

If you believe that one of your debtors has committee fraud, you should contact a bankruptcy attorney about the “nondischargeability” provisions in the bankruptcy code that may be available to you. The Bankruptcy Code sets forth an extensive list of debts that are nondischargeable. Unfortunately, nondischargeability is not automatic – a creditor that holds such a debt must file a complaint with the Bankruptcy Court seeking to have the debt declared nondischargeable. A nondischargeability complaint must usually be filed within about sixty (60) to ninety (90) days after the debtor files his or her bankruptcy petition. 

 

Who Pays for My Lawsuit?

September 14, 2010

You do.  Seems simple enough.  However, you would be surprised at the number of creditors that are under the mistaken belief that the debtor will be on the hook for any and all expenses associated with a creditor’s lawsuit to collect on a debt.

For example, your case is scheduled for trial.  The parties are not close to settlement.  The debtor has retained counsel and has fought you every step of the way.  They have offered a 50% settlement.  You are not taking a dime less than, “everything your owed and then some.”

You must appear as a witness for trial.  The debtor still will not meet your demands.  “Well, you tell that son of a b@tch that I’m flying first class; staying at the Four Seasons and charging him for my time out of the office.  It’s going to cost him a lot more if I come to court.”

It is at this point that I must kindly point out that the debtor will not be on the hook for any of the aforementioned expenses in this $3,000.00 collection action.

This is result of a general rule of law often referred to as the “American Rule.”  The American Rule provides that each party is general responsible for paying its own attorneys’ fees and expenses associated with litigation.  Like any rule, there are exceptions. The two most common exceptions to the American Rule are the existence of a statute or contract that provides for the imposition of attorneys’ fees and costs on another party.  However, as stated above, the general rule is that every party, event the winning party, must pay its own attorneys’ fees and costs.

The reasoning behind the American Rule is to prevent discouraging people from seeking redress for their perceived wrongs or from expanding legal jurisrudence.  The American Rule recognizes that any other rule would have a chilling effect on one’s decision to pursue a meritorious claim merely because they may have to pay the defendant’s expenses if unsuccessful.

In sum, just because you are suing someone don’t think that it isn’t going to cost you.

 

Be Wary: Bankruptcy Filings Continue to Rise

August 19, 2010

According to a recent article in the New York Times, individual and corporate bankruptcies are at a five-year high. As a creditor, here are three things to keep in mind during these difficult financial times:

 

1)      With the increase in “under water” secured creditors, unsecured creditors are receiving less and less on their claims through bankruptcy. It may be a good idea to have a backup if a customer fails to pay its bills. Letters of credit, lien rights, and partial payments on delivery are all ways to mitigate the damage that can be caused by a failing customer’s bankruptcy.

2)      Just because a customer has always paid its bills in the past does not mean it will do so in the future. Increasingly, even healthy companies are struggling financially. Keep an  eye on credit terms that you extend to all of your customers, both big and small. It never hurts to reevaluate the terms on which you extend credit to your largest customers. If you conduct a credit worthiness analysis and find something troubling, it may cause you to take additional action to protect yourself from unpaid bills. If the credit check reveals no problems, at least you can sleep soundly knowing that those customers are healthy enough to pay their bills in the future.

3)      Preference actions are on the rise. Debtors and trustees are looking to preference actions as a means to fund distributions to unsecured creditors. This means creditors should be aware of the defenses to those actions and should review their “danger” clients to make sure that payment times are not getting too high. Ideally, payments should be made within (or very close to) payment terms (“NET 30,” etc.). If customers are not doing so, it may be prudent to limit the amount of credit that you extend now to protect yourself from a preference action in the future.

Guaranty or Surety?

August 10, 2010

Under Pennsylvania common law, “the primary difference between a surety and a guarantor is the time at which a creditor can collect from each.  With regard to suretyship, the creditor can look to the surety for immediate payment upon the occurrence of a default by the principal obligor or debtor … However, where an individual is a guarantor, the creditor must first attempt to collect the debt from the principal debtor/obligor before demanding performance from the guarantor.”  Reuter v. Citizens & Northern Bank, 410 Pa.Super 199, 208, 599 A.2d 673, 678 (Pa. Super. 1991).

 

Sounds troubling for a creditor.  After reading that statement, there is probably one question that quickly comes to mind.  What constitutes an “attempt?”  This question could be argued a hundred times over.  Thankfully, the Pennsylvania legislature has brought some clarity to this question. 

 

Under 13 Pa.C.S. § 1201, which is Pennsylvania’s codified version of the Uniform Commercial Code’s general definitional section, “[s]urety. Includes a guarantor or other secondary obligor.” 13 Pa.C.S. § 1201.  Thus, no “timing” requirement exists as to when a creditor can look to a guarantor for payment of a debt.      

 

Moreover, Pennsylvania statute provides that:                                                  

 

“[e]very written agreement hereafter made by one person to answer for the default of another shall subject such person to the liabilities of a suretyship, and shall confer upon him the rights incident thereto, unless such agreement shall contain in substance the words: “This is not intended to be a contract of suretyship,” or unless each portion of such agreement intended to modify the rights and liabilities of suretyship shall contain in substance the words: “This portion of the agreement is not intended to impose the liability of a suretyship.”

 

      8 P.S. § 1. See, also, Keystone Bank v. Flooring Specialists, Inc., 513 Pa. 103, 113, 518 A.2d 1179, 1184 (1986) (“section 1201 of the UCC is not the sole authority for treating a guarantor, especially where he has ‘guaranteed payment,’ as a surety.”).

 

      Accordingly, where Pennsylvania law applies, a creditor with adequately drafted documents does not have to first look to the principal debtor/obligor for payment before pursuing a guarantor.    

 

 

 

 

A Refresher on 503(b)(9) “20-Day Claims” Part 2

July 26, 2010

Unfortunately, the Code does not require that the administrative claim be paid in full immediately after the Court allows the claim. Instead, the Code only sets the relative priority of the claim.  In Chapter 11, a requirement for the confirmation of a Plan is that administrative expense claims be paid “in full and in cash.” If the case is ultimately declared “administratively insolvent” – i.e. the debtor does not generate sufficient cash to pay its administrative claims – then 503(b)(9) creditors will probably not receive the full amount of their claims.

 

While the court can order immediate payment of these claims, they often decline to do so. The courts have tended to be very debtor friendly on this issue. In two recent cases, In Re Bookbinders and In Re Global Home Products, LLC, creditors attempted to force immediate payment of 503(b)(9) claims. In both cases, creditors urged the court to order immediate payment of the claims, arguing that there may not be enough assets left at the end of the bankruptcy to pay the 503(b)(9) claims in full. In both cases, the courts’ reasoned that the Code did not explicitly provide for immediate payment. The courts in both cases denied the creditors’ request for immediate payment of their 503(b)(9) claims. Unfortunately, in the Global Home Products case, 503(b)(9) creditors ultimately received less than 50 percent of their claims under the debtor’s Plan.

 

While a 503(b)(9) creditor appears to face an uphill battle, it is not all bad news. In fact, section 503(b)(9) has greatly increased the potential for recovery for large numbers of unsecured creditors nationwide. Notwithstanding the difficulties of allowance and payment that 503(b)(9) creditors face, they stand in a better position than a general unsecured creditor. Section 503(b)(9) claims are given the same priority status as the debtors’ attorneys’ and other professionals’ fees. In the grand scheme of the bankruptcy system, this is about the best position in which a trade creditor can sit.

 

Since many 503(b)(9) motions are lightly contested, they can be handled by experienced creditors’ rights counsel at a modest price. In fact, a valid 503(b)(9) claim is often stipulated to by the debtor early in the case. Often the debtor will agree to allow the claim in full, if the creditor agrees to forego payment until a plan can be confirmed. This system benefits all parties because if all 503(b)(9) creditors demanded immediate payment in full, many debtors would not have sufficient cash flow to meet those demands, and would terminate operations shortly after entering bankruptcy. Since debtors rarely enter bankruptcy with significant cash reserves, such an outcome would likely result in 503(b)(9) creditors receiving far less than 100 percent of their claims.

 

If a creditor is willing to accept a reduced amount on its 503(b)(9) claim, then it should consider “claim traders” – companies that purchase bankruptcy claims from creditors. Claim traders are often very interested in 503(b)(9) claims and, depending on the circumstances of the particular debtor and its prospects for reorganizing, are often willing to pay a very large percentage of the claim.

A Refresher on 503(b)(9) “20-Day Claims” Part 1

July 8, 2010

 

 

Since clients ask about this all  the time, I thought it would be a good time to give a quick refresher on 20-day claims and briefly discuss how creditors are faring in Bankruptcy cases when it comes to 20-day claims.

 

Under most state laws, a credit seller has the right to “reclaim” goods (get them back or get a lien for the value), from a defaulting buyer. Most state laws require a reclamation notice be given within 20 days of the delivery. Some require as few as 10 days. Recognizing the difficulty with these short timeframes, earlier changes to the Bankruptcy Code enabled creditors to give notice within 20 days after the bankruptcy filing. The right still only covered deliveries in the 10 days before the bankruptcy.

 

The 2005 amendments expanded the notice rights to provide that, when goods are sold to a debtor within 45 days of a bankruptcy filing, the seller has a right to reclaim those goods, so long as the seller gives notice within the first 20 days of the bankruptcy. Failure to provide this notice results in a waiver of the reclamation right. Sellers often miss this “notice deadline” and lose their right to reclaim their goods. Further, because the rights of a reclaiming seller are subject to the rights of a prior, properly perfected lienholder on the type of goods sold, this reclamation right is often illusory. Section 503(b)(9) was inserted into the Bankruptcy Code as a way of offering relief to sellers of goods whose reclamation right is rendered meaningless – either by failing to give the required notice or because of a prior lienholder’s rights.

 

Creditors have had mixed results in the first three years following the addition of section 503(b)(9) to the Code. For starters, obtaining an allowed administrative claim requires an upfront investment. The creditor must do one of two things: 1) get the debtor to agree to allow the 503(b)(9) claim; or, 2) if the debtor refuses to agree, file a motion with the court. This means that the creditor often has to hire an attorney and expend resources upfront.

 

More importantly, debtors will often challenge the 503(b)(9) claim in an attempt to get the creditor to negotiate the amount. Debtors will often claim that they received the goods outside of the required 20-day window. This forces the creditor to show evidence, through supporting documentation and testimony. Debtors sometimes take this position solely as a negotiation tactic. Debtors know that it will cost the creditor valuable time and money to litigate the case and that the creditor may be willing to settle for less in order to avoid litigation.

Be sure to check back for A Refresher on 503 (b)(9) “20-Day Claims” Part 2

Where is Your Collateral?

June 14, 2010

It should go without saying that as a secured creditor you should be aware of the location of any and all collateral in the debtor’s possession that is the subject of your security interest.  However, one would be surprised at how many secured creditors do not know this vital information when it comes time to file suit, or are surprised to learn that the debtor is hiding the collateral after suit has been filed.   

 

Once a debtor starts to fall behind on payments, in addition to demanding payment, the debtor should also be asked where the collateral is located.  At this early stage, the debtor is going to be more willing to give the secured creditor’s representative information because the debtor believes that the creditor will still work with him.  Often, it is once the creditor decides to enforce its security that the debtor decides to go silent.  

 

Knowing the location of your collateral prior to taking legal action will give you the option of a pre-judgment writ of seizure.  A pre-judgment writ of seizure allows a secured creditor to take possession of the collateral prior to obtaining a judgment for possession.  This remedy is used when it is thought that the debtor may attempt to hide or damage the collateral.  Pre-judgment seizure is a very detailed and complicated process that your creditors rights attorney can explain to you.    

 

An additional benefit of knowing where your collateral is located at all times is the ability to utilize “self help” to recover the collateral upon the debtor’s default.  However, when exercising “self help” there cannot be a “breach of the peace.”  Courts have held that a “breach of the peace” has occurred when a repossession agent continued to take collateral despite the debtor’s verbal demands to cease action.  Thus, as a practical matter, “self help” is often not a viable option. 

 

Regardless, knowing the location of your collateral will enable both your creditors rights attorney and the sheriff to move quickly in coordinating recovery.  Once you become engaged in a “treasure hunt,” it is only going to cost more in court costs and fees to recover your collateral.     

 

 

Federal Court Replevin Actions: Making Use of a Valuable, but Often Overlooked Tool

June 2, 2010

So you’ve met with an attorney and you have been informed that you have a “strong” case. Of course you instruct your attorney to immediately run to the nearest courthouse and file a writ, summons, complaint or whatever legal document is necessary in order to immediately get the ball rolling. In the words of a certain sports broadcaster on crisp fall mornings, “Not so fast my friend!”1

Almost as important to the determination of whether or not you have a factual basis for a lawsuit, is the decision of what court to file that lawsuit in.2 However, before narrowing in on a particular court, there is the question of what type of court you will file in.

Our country has a dual court system; we have both state and federal courts. Generally, the difference between the two court systems boils down to jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a court’s ability to hear a particular matter. State and local courts are, for the most part, courts of general jurisdiction with the ability to hear almost every type of dispute. Federal courts are established under the U.S. Constitution for the purpose of deciding disputes involving the Constitution and laws passed by Congress. However, there are certain scenarios where a particular matter may fall within both the jurisdiction of the state and federal court systems.

 

Pennsylvania State Law aka Act 47

April 30, 2010

 

I read this article in the Pittsburgh Tribune Review:(http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/s_672744.html) and it got me thinking about state oversight of financially distressed municipalities. Under Pennsylvania state law (commonly referred to as Act 47), municipalities in the Commonwealth are not eligible to file for federal bankruptcy protection without first implementing a financial recovery plan overseen by a state appointed board.

 

This approach to municipal reorganization stands in stark contrast to the federal bankruptcy code. Under the state law, a distressed municipality attempts to cut expenses and increase revenue in an effort to pay off its debts. The result is often a myriad of political “quick-fixes,” such as new taxes, elimination of social programs, and the sale or lease of municipal assets, such as parking garages.

 

The state system lacks two significant components that the bankruptcy code provides to distressed companies or municipalities to assist in reorganization. First, Act 47 does not allow for the discharge of debts. Instead, Act 47 requires that the municipality attempt to restructure certain debts or pay them off with a lump sum. Of course, financially distressed municipalities usually lack the cash flow to make lump sum payments on large debts. Similarly, Act 47 does not allow municipalities to cancel unfavorable contracts. The inability to discharge debts and cancel unprofitable contracts would have proven fatal to several big companies that have emerged from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy over the past two decades; GM, US Airways, and the Pittsburgh Penguins, just to name a few.

 

Second, the Bankruptcy Code gives corporate debtors the ability to “cram down” union contracts for the best interest of all creditors. In other words, the Bankruptcy Code allows union contracts to be reasonably restructured so that the company’s employees do not sap all of the company’s future revenue, leaving nothing for creditors. Act 47 system has no such provision and, in fact, relies exclusively on the political leaders of the municipality – often unions’ closest allies – to enact changes in applicable collective bargaining agreements. Such a system is destined to fail and has done so, repeatedly.

 

The Tribune Review reports that 25 municipalities have entered Act 47 oversight but only 6 have escaped. Proof of Act 47’s shortcomings can be seen right here in Pittsburgh, which was forced into this state form of receivership in 2004 and has spent nearly 6 years attempting to right its financial ship, but to no avail. As of this writing, Pittsburgh’s employee pensions have only 30% of the money necessary to fund future payouts. Unions have refused to agree to reduce their benefits and the politicians responsible for forcing such concessions lack the political backbone to press for change. In short, politics has taken over and, 6 years later, the City is still on the verge of bankruptcy. How has Act 47 helped the City of Pittsburgh? It hasn’t.

 

With the economic downturn and lack of revenue, more and more municipalities in Pennsylvania are at risk of falling into Act 47 protection. Those municipalities are staring at five to ten years of financial purgatory, during which no meaningful changes take place and bankruptcy continues to loom on the horizon. I say let Pennsylvania municipalities file bankruptcy.